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1. Introduction 
 Often, it is easy to take for granted many of the things we find ourselves lucky enough to 
have. This applies to all aspects of life, which includes things such as: getting as a decent job, a 
good car, or perhaps even the simplicity of sitting on the back porch on a nice evening. Many 
people think it’s necessary to give thanks to some higher power for these blessings of life. 
Further, some think it immoral not to give thanks; indeed, for these folks, it is through faith in 
this higher power that we are able to do anything in the first place. The passage, “I can do all 
things through Christ which strengtheneth me,”1 sums this sentiment up in a simple and concise 
way. Sentiments such as these lay the foundations for certain moral attitudes and values. In some 
cases, these values lay the foundations for asceticism. Typically, ascetic values are founded in 
ideas of “poverty, humility, [and] chastity.”2 For those people who believe in such things, moral 
values are precisely what is needed for one to have a “good” life. For Friedrich Nietzsche, 
though, these are exactly the sentiments that one must avoid if one wants to live a flourishing 
life. For the purposes of this paper, I will take flourishing to mean whatever one needs to do in 
order to make his or her life go well. 
In order to begin a study into the possible error of this mode of thought, Nietzsche writes 
a “genealogy” of this typically Judeo-Christian idea. But what is a genealogy? Further, how is it 
that a genealogy can provide a critique if it is only an explanatory project of how we arrived at 
our current systems of valuation? In this paper, I will examine multiple positions of how to 
properly interpret Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals in order to constitute an 
understanding of the main ideas of the work. For example, examining the works of Gilbert 
                                               
1
  The Holy Bible. Authorized King James Version, Thomas Nelson, 2001. Print. P. 762. Emphasis Added.  
2
  Nietzsche, Friedrich. “On the Genealogy of Morals.” On the Genealogy of Morals and Ecce Homo. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. 3-163. Print. P. 108. 
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Harman and Michel Foucault will be helpful in understanding how genealogy works. This will 
provide us with a firm grasp of Nietzsche’s methods and ideas regarding how we arrive at our 
respective concepts of morality. Next, I will proceed into a discussion of how Nietzsche intends 
to set up a critique of morality using his Genealogy as a foundation. P.J.E. Kail, for instance, 
argues that the Genealogy helps to destabilize our faith in morality rather than providing a full-
on critique of morality. This will help to answer the question of whether or not Nietzsche is 
successful in his genealogical work of setting up a full critique of morality. Further, this will help 
one decide if it is valuable to adopt a Nietzschean view regarding morality. Ultimately, these 
considerations will demonstrate that the typical justifications given for morality fail in their 
efforts to establish morality as a system of “true,” or “given,” values. Rather, these values are 
contingent upon a great number of relative factors which actually provide support against typical 
justifications of morality. Further, it will be argued that the Genealogy brings to light a major 
concern for Nietzsche: that moral values might hinder the ability of people, especially his 
“higher types” to flourish. These factors allow for the Genealogy to provide ample reasons to 
pursue a fuller critique of moral values in order to fully investigate their possible detrimental 
effects.  
 
2. What is the Genealogy of Morals? What Methods Does Nietzsche Employ? 
 To begin, we must first consider what Nietzsche is trying to accomplish from a general 
standpoint. Very broadly stated, one could summarize the project as a naturalistic account of the 
history and origins of morality. This is quite an undertaking, and Nietzsche emphasizes that his 
original “question of where our good and evil really originated . . . soon transformed [the] 
problem into another one: under what conditions did man devise these value judgments good and 
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evil? and what value do they themselves possess?”3 His On the Genealogy of Morals ties 
together three separate essays that each give an account of how this phenomenon occurred at 
various stages in history. So, what exactly is genealogy? Foucault writes that “[g]enealogy is 
gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary. It operates on a field of entangled and confused 
parchments, on documents that have been scratched over and recopied many times.”4 In essence, 
genealogy is a historical method that involves investigation into how ideas and practices have 
gathered various interpretations over time. Guess writes that the genealogical method of history 
exposes that a given practice, idea, or value “has a bi-partite structure: a set of antecedently 
existing practices, modes of behaviour, perception, and feeling which at a certain time are given 
an interpretation which imposes on them a meaning they did not have before.”5 How, then, does 
Nietzsche proceed in giving a genealogy of morality? 
 
2.1 Breakdown of the Genealogy 
 Each essay of the Genealogy provides an account of how various aspects of morality 
have descended through time to arrive at their current valuations. The first essay, entitled “‘Good 
and Evil’, ‘Good and Bad,’” explains the “slave revolt” in which “noble” values are inverted by 
groups of people rebelling out of ressentiment towards their oppressors. This essay begins by 
examining the social situations under which these resentful valuations begin, and how, over time, 
they begin to constitute certain psychological states and character traits.  
                                               
3
 GM, P. 16-17. 
4
 Foucault, Michel. “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History.” The Foucault Reader. Ed. Paul Rainbow. New York: Vintage 
Books, 2010. P. 76-100. Print. P. 76. 
5
 Guess, Raymond. “Nietzsche and Genealogy.” European Journal of Philosophy. P. 274-292. Cambridge: Basil 
Blackwell Ltd., 1994. 
Greene 6 
 
In order to re-valuate the values of their oppressors, the slaves observe what is “good” in the 
nobles and invert them thereby making those values “evil.” What is “good” for the slave, then, 
are those values which would normally be considered “bad” by the nobles, e.g. humility, 
meekness, and self-sacrifice.  
 What is important to note is that the original judgments of good and bad were not moral 
judgments. Nietzsche is particularly concerned with how these judgments became moralized. 
Clark points out that the idea that good and bad consisted of a set of moral judgments, as 
Kaufmann suggests, is misleading.
6
 Nietzsche’s story in the first essay examines the evaluations 
of the nobles as values of good and bad that particularly regard certain character traits; for 
example, a noble would probably have certain traits such as pride and high-mindedness. “Good” 
in this sense refers to a positive valuation which the nobles acquire by looking at their own 
positions in the world and seeing them as value-worthy. On the other hand, character traits such 
as being lowly and meek would receive “bad” valuations from the nobles because they are 
opposite the traits which they see in themselves. The slaves are not worthy of any kind of moral 
reproach for their status; rather, the masters simply look at them with a sense of disdain. When 
the slave class becomes fed up with their situations at the hand of the nobles, their ressentiment 
fueled revolt “invents” morality. On this scheme, to be “evil” is necessarily to be immoral and 
vice versa. For the slaves, this is redeeming and empowering because they are now “good” for 
accepting their conditions and living humbly and meekly; the nobles, however, are “evil” for 
their prideful, vengeful, and otherwise “sinful” behavior. If the nobles “can be blamed for what 
they are, they can be thought deserving of punishment on that basis. Indeed, if one acts are evil, 
then such actions certainly seem worthy of reproach and condemnation. On the other hand, since 
                                               
6
 Clark, Maudemarie. “Nietzsche’s Immoralism and the Concept of Morality.” Nietzsche, Genealogy, Morality: 
Essays on Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals. Ed. Richard Schact. Los Angeles: University of California 
Press, 1994. P. 15-34. Print. P. 23. 
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it seems natural to regard the good as deserving of reward for being as such, it will be much 
easier for to convince themselves that they really are superior and do not want to be like the 
nobles at all.”7 Here we fully see the genealogical method at work in its ability to uncover the 
explanations for how moral judgments developed through the slave revolt.  
The second essay follows a similar structure. Very briefly stated, it provides a 
genealogical account of how debt and guilt are related in the development of bad conscience. For 
Nietzsche, the idea of guilt evolved from feelings of indebtedness; if one is unable to repay his or 
her debt, then the creditor would be able to extract what is owed in the form of punishment. 
Punishment, in its ancient form, was an act of cruelty which served the purpose of making right 
on debts that were owed. Further, Nietzsche argues that this practice of punishment also served a 
very human instinct for aggression and cruelty. However, this instinct is not conducive to a 
peaceful and humble people who seek mercy and cooperation. In an effort to better serve the 
interests of slave morality, guilt is moralized into an act of self-cruelty. What this means is that 
the instincts for cruelty still exist, but they cannot be vented on one’s neighbors in a modernized, 
or civilized, society. Consequently, cruelty is turned inward towards oneself. This moralized 
form of guilt is referred to as “bad conscience.” Again, we see Nietzsche giving a naturalistic 
explanation of a nonmoral practice, i.e. guilt, that is revaluated and given a moral interpretation. 
Lastly, the third essay seizes upon the meaning of ascetic ideals. Recall that Nietzsche 
characterizes these ideals as upholding values such as poverty, humility, and chastity. So far, we 
have seen how slave morality inverted noble values and latched onto the idea of bad conscience 
in order to promote moral values through acts of self-cruelty. The issue, then, is how one is 
supposed to explain his or her suffering if he is living a pure and good life. Nietzsche writes that 
the problem of the human animal “was . . . that there was no answer to the crying question, ‘why 
                                               
7
 Clark, P. 25. 
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do I suffer?’ . . . The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse that lay 
over mankind so far.”8 Recall that the original slave revolt stemmed from ressentiment towards 
the nobles because of the suffering the slaves endured. However, even when one lives morally he 
or she is still subjected to meaningless suffering.  
One can easily imagine how one might despair over the suffering he or she endures even 
when performing at “maximum moral capacity.” The ascetic ideal offers itself as a solution to 
this problem; the ascetic priest presents the ascetic ideal as a medicine for the sick and afflicted 
masses. Nietzsche explains how the ascetic priest uses the idea of sin as the explanation for 
suffering.
9
 This means that misfortune is the result of one’s sinful human nature and suffering 
can be understood as a sort of punishment for these shortcomings. Therefore, to remedy the 
meaninglessness of suffering in the world, one should practice the ascetic ideal. Nietzsche writes 
in §28 of the Genealogy: “The meaninglessness of suffering, not suffering itself, was the curse 
that lay over mankind so far – and the ascetic ideal offered man meaning!”10 This does not solve 
all of the problems of suffering, however; in fact, Nietzsche says that the guilt associated with 
such beliefs brings about new forms of internalized, “life-destructive” suffering.11 This is the 
primary reason why Nietzsche is critical of the ascetic ideal as a means to answering the “big 
questions” of life.   
 In some respects, these summaries are certainly oversimplifications of Nietzsche’s 
nuanced stories and arguments from the Genealogy; nevertheless, they make grasping certain 
important features of Nietzsche’s philosophy easier to understand. In particular, they illuminate 
his anti-realism, his naturalist viewpoint, and the ideas of emergence and descent, as elaborated 
                                               
8
 GM, P. 162. 
9
 Ibid, P. 139-141. 
10
 GM, P. 162. 
11
 Ibid, P. 162.  
Greene 9 
 
by Foucault. These concepts are crucial to an understanding of the Genealogy and how it 
operates as a historical account of the origins of morality. 
 
2.2 Genealogical Methods 
 Anti-realism is a relatively straight-forward concept. Since Nietzsche’s project 
specifically targets morality, anti-realism in this sense means that there are no universal moral 
facts. This means that any position which maintains that a particular moral system which is 
meant to apply to each and every individual is misguided. Leiter writes that “anti-realism about 
value is explanatory: moral facts don’t figure into the ‘best explanation’ of experience, and so 
are not real constituents of the objective world. Moral values, in short, can be ‘explained 
away.’”12 It should be noted that Leiter’s use of “objective” here should be approached with 
caution. Although there may be no “universal” moral truths, it may be the case that there are 
things which are objectively true in the world. For example, the noble values of the First Essay 
are directly at odds with the values of slave morality. In order for one to have precedence over 
the other, one would have to make some sort of realist appeal to universal moral standards; 
however, Nietzsche’s view is that no such moral facts exist. Still, it may be objectively true that 
slave morality does serve the interests of the slaves despite the absence of universal truth. This 
point might be illustrated well with an example from horticulture. Generally, it might be 
considered universally true that plants need plenty of water to survive. However, we can 
certainly find instances where such a claim is false. In my own limited experience, my 
overwatering of small cacti and jade plants have resulted in the plants withering away. So, while 
this maxim of “plants need plenty of water to survive” might hold true for certain species, such 
                                               
12
 Leiter, P. 120. 
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as irises and hibiscus, it cannot be said to apply each and every plant, such as the long-gone 
succulents I attempted to cultivate. However, it is objectively true of irises that they indeed need 
plenty of water to thrive.
13
 This idea is true with regards to a person’s individual values and 
standards as well. If two individuals are arguing over which of their principles is superior to the 
other’s, it might be tempting to make some sort of realist appeal to universal moral standards; 
however, Nietzsche’s view is that no such universal moral facts exist. His position regarding the 
anti-realism regarding universal morality is further illustrated by his naturalist viewpoint. 
 Naturalism is “a methodological view about how one should do philosophy: 
philosophical inquiry, on this view, should be continuous with empirical inquiry in the 
sciences.”14With regards to issues of morality, Nietzsche writes that “[t]here are no moral 
phenomena at all, but only moral interpretation of phenomena.”15 In order to unpack what 
Nietzsche means by this, consider the following thought experiment: 
If you round a corner and see a group of young hoodlums pour gasoline on a cat 
and ignite it, you do not need to conclude that what they are doing is wrong; you 
do not need to figure anything out; you can see that it is wrong. But is your 
reaction due to the actual wrongness of what you see or is it simply a reflection of 
your moral ‘sense,’ a ‘sense’ that you have acquired perhaps as a result of your 
moral upbringing?
16
 
In other words, when one witnesses a certain phenomenon, it is unclear whether that occurrence 
by itself has any given moral properties. It could be the case, as Nietzsche suggests, that you 
                                               
13
 Special thanks to Dr. Leslie MacAvoy for helping construct this example.  
14
 Leiter, P. 2. 
15
 Nietzsche, Friedrich. Beyond Good and Evil. Trans. Walter Kaufmann. New York: Vintage Books, 1989. Print. § 
108. 
16
 Harman, Gilbert. The Nature of Morality: An Introduction to Ethics. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. 
Print. P. 4. 
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don’t “see” the moral wrongness of anything. Instead, any moral content would be provided by 
the observer’s moral beliefs.  
For Nietzsche, a naturalist approach is the best method of explaining one’s psycho-social 
type. Each person’s type is constructed by various factors such as the social context in which he 
or she is raised as well as certain conscious, and even subconscious, attitudes towards the world. 
In order to explain a given moral judgment, then, it is unnecessary to appeal to some universal 
moral position; instead, the judgment can be explained naturalistically in terms of the agent’s 
psycho-social type-facts.
17
 One of Nietzsche’s goals in the Genealogy is to explain how one 
might arrive at his or her set of values as a result of his or her particular type. For example, recall 
the values of the slaves: humility, meekness, and forgiveness are considered praiseworthy to 
these people. For Nietzsche, their psycho-social type plays a large role in this valuation. Were 
the slaves more powerful and able to lash out against their masters in more aggressive fashions, 
then their values would be much different. However, the First Essay suggests that their inability 
to overthrow the masters led to the development of a psychology of ressentiment. The moral 
judgments of Good and Evil, as proposed by slave morality, are products of a resentful psycho-
social type. In order to fully comprehend Nietzsche’s naturalist explanation of these types and 
the beliefs they hold, one must be able to understand the way in which values and beliefs 
develop, emerge, and change over time. For this, Michel Foucault’s essay, Nietzsche, Genealogy, 
History, will be most useful. Foucault notes the importance of understanding two key concepts of 
the genealogical method: descent and emergence. 
 Descent and emergence refer to the ways in which we arrive at whatever systems of value 
we have. Foucault states that genealogy “opposes itself to the search for ‘origins.’”18 This is 
                                               
17
 Leiter, P. 188-120. 
18
 Foucault, P. 77. 
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because finding a singular “origin” of a value or idea is impossible; rather, genealogy seeks to 
find how a certain value, e.g. morality, arises given a plethora of separate lines of ancestry that 
have no single historical stopping point or “origin.”19 In order to provide a naturalistic account, 
one must look into various social phenomena that have occurred throughout time. Descent, then,  
“is the ancient affiliation to a group, sustained by bonds of blood, tradition, or 
social class. . . But the traits it attempts to identify are not the generic 
characteristics of an individual, a sentiment, or an idea . . . rather, it seeks the 
subtle, singular, and sub individual marks that might possibly intersect in them to 
form a network that is difficult to unravel. . . [Genealogy] is to identify the 
accidents, the minute deviations . . . the errors, the false appraisals, and the faulty 
calculations that gave birth to those things that continue to exist and have value 
for us.”20 
The idea here is that this part of genealogy studies these networks of history to learn more about 
the minutia of influences that are at play in the history of our values. Emergence is described as 
“a place of confrontation, but not as a closed field offering the spectacle of a struggle among 
equals. . . it is a ‘non-place,’ a pure distance, which indicates that the adversaries do not belong 
to a common space. Consequently, no one is responsible for an emergence; no one can glory in 
it, since it always occurs in the interstice.”21 In these instances of emergence, certain forces 
dominate others, and, later, are subject to domination themselves. Through the emergence of the 
“victorious” forces, values are established, norms are set up, and culture adapts. In the cases of 
the three essays of Nietzsche’s Genealogy, both of these factors, i.e. descent and emergence, play 
an important role in deciphering how practices such as punishment (GM, 2nd Essay) come to 
                                               
19
 Guess, P. 276. 
20
 Foucault. P. 81. 
21
 Foucault, P. 84-85. 
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have the social status they carry now. This also demonstrates how values are very contingent 
upon the social milieu in which the values were established; they are contingent upon all of the 
minute influences of centuries of social change and development. All of these factors play 
important roles in the mindsets of a certain people’s psycho-social type as well.  
As society grows and develops, people’s attitudes and belief systems will change. 
Consider, for example, the attitudes held in America during the 1950’s with regards to rock and 
roll music as opposed to contemporary attitudes. The famous appearance of Elvis Presley on the 
Ed Sullivan show resulted in a great deal of controversy at the time because many evangelicals 
thought that The King’s dancing was inappropriate and lewd. The evangelical type would 
probably include values and psychological attitudes such as reverence for tradition and 
conservatism, modesty, and fear with regards to the moral degeneration of society. However, 
despite these concerns, public opinion regarding rock and roll quickly changed and Elvis’ 
dancing is now considered to be quite tame when compared to contemporary pop music videos. 
Now, these changes in judgment took place within a mere century’s time, and they are still 
developing today. A contemporary evangelical type would probably still hold many of the same 
beliefs with regards to immoral behaviors and their effects on society, but their focus is directed 
towards other issues such as whether they should have to bake cakes for homosexual couples 
rather than popular music. In this instance, we see a general form of a certain personality type, 
and how various cultural phenomena influence the development of their attitudes and judgments. 
If one considers the vastness of human history, then we will see that cultural and 
psychological factors have very important influences on what sort of value judgments one might 
have. As a consequence, this complicates the work of the genealogist by requiring deep study 
and consideration of the vast number of dynamics at play in the descent and emergence of 
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values. However, since it is such a rigorous method, it does bode well for what a properly 
constructed genealogy discovers. Such findings are certainly significant and deserve due 
consideration. So, what might one learn from the findings within Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy 
of Morals?  
 
3. What Does the Genealogy Provide? 
 We have seen how genealogy is supposed to work as an explanatory method of 
discovering how certain values change and are given new interpretations over time. Nietzsche’s 
On the Genealogy of Morals specifically demonstrates a naturalistic view of the descent and 
emergence of “modern morality” and its interpretive values. What are we to take away from this 
project? Often it is suggested that the Genealogy is an essential element to Nietzsche’s project of 
the critique of morality and the revaluation of values. The critique of morality and the naturalistic 
account of its growth are interconnected aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy; the latter helps to 
inform the former so that a critique is possible. The question we must ask at this point is: how 
does the Genealogy work to set up such a critique of morality? First, we must discover what 
Nietzsche is referring to by “morality.” Next, it will be necessary to see how morality is 
questionable and why Nietzsche feels that a critique is necessary. Lastly, we will see how the 
Genealogy serves as the groundwork for a full critique. 
 
3.1 Defining the Scope of Morality 
 So what is morality for Nietzsche? Why does he go so far as to call himself an 
immoralist? Perhaps it will be useful to begin with the distinction between morality and ethics. 
Ethics can be stated as  
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“‘any scheme for regulating the relations between people that works through 
informal sanctions and internalized dispositions’ . . . Morality, on the other hand, 
is a particular ethical orientation, or a ‘range’ of such outlooks, which is ‘so much 
with us,’ according to Williams, ‘that moral philosophy spends much of its time 
discussing the differences between these outlooks, rather than the difference 
between all of them and everything else’ . . . This is precisely Nietzsche’s 
position. He thinks that morality is ‘so much with us’ because it presents itself as 
the only object of ethical life.”22 
Nietzsche’s point is not to jettison all of ethics; however, he is certainly suspicious of the value 
of one’s moral interpretations. Clearly, then, we will need to understand a bit more about what 
morality is for Nietzsche before moving on to why morality might be questionable.  
 In determining the scope of Nietzsche’s critique, perhaps a helpful place to turn for this 
subject is Brian Leiter’s explanation of Morality in the Pejorative Sense (MPS).23 What would 
qualify as an instance of MPS for Nietzsche? According to Leiter, the scope of the critique refers 
to general characteristics that are shared by MPS. Any particular MPS is    
“an ethical system that has a pro-attitude toward, among other things, happiness, 
altruism, and equality. . . A culture permeated with a pro-attitude toward 
happiness and a con-attitude towards suffering will make it difficult for creative 
human beings, great artists and thinkers - Nietzsche’s higher types, according to 
Leiter - to fulfill their potential: to endure and even welcome the suffering 
                                               
22
 Clark, Maudemarie. “Nietzsche’s Contribution to Ethics.” Nietzsche on Ethics and Politics. Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 2015. Print. P. 63. 
23
 Leiter, P. 58-61. 
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necessary for the realization of that potential, instead of squandering themselves 
in the pursuit of happiness.”24 
With morality defined in terms of MPS, it might not be entirely clear to see how ascetic values of 
poverty, chastity, and humility are subject to Nietzsche’s investigation, but MPS does expand the 
investigation further into values such as happiness, pleasure, and comfort. Leiter explicitly states 
the qualities of any given MPS, and, generally, MPS is defined in terms of certain normative 
attitudes; for example, a “pro-attitude” toward happiness, altruism, pity, and selflessness are all 
qualities which could lead a particular ethical system to be labeled as an instance of MPS. On the 
other hand, a “con-attitude” towards suffering, self-interest, and taking enjoyment in satisfying 
one’s instinctual inclinations are other qualifications of MPS.25 One issue this characterization of 
Nietzsche’s position faces, though, is that it leaves out certain aspects of Nietzsche’s view which 
are important to a proper understanding of the scope of morality. 
 According to Leiter, the reason that MPS constitutes the scope of what Nietzsche intends 
in his discussion of morality is that the attitudes maintained in MPS undermine the potential 
flourishing of “higher types.” I will save the discussion of higher types for later in the paper; for 
now, it is important to note that this characterization of morality is not sufficient to encompass 
all of what Nietzsche intends in his discussions of morality. Specifically, MPS, as it has so far 
been characterized, leaves out the notion of moral blame; for Nietzsche, moral blame is one of 
the means by which a practitioner of a certain morality would accuse another of immoral actions 
in order to elicit certain psychological states within the supposed offender. Let’s return to the 
distinction between good/bad and Good/Evil for a moment. The masters of the First Essay make 
their judgments in terms of their own “goodness;” Nietzsche writes that “the noble, powerful, 
                                               
24
 Clark, P. 64. 
25
 Leiter, P. 103. 
Greene 17 
 
high-stationed and high-minded, who felt and established themselves and their actions as good, 
that is, of the first rank, in contradistinction to all the low, low-minded, common and plebeian.”26 
This means that good, in the noble mode of valuation, is self-affirming. In order to determine 
what is good, the masters look to themselves and affirm goodness as being those qualities which 
they perceive themselves as possessing. On the other hand, “bad” on this mode of valuation is 
simply what masters are not. This illuminates a couple of points which deserve elaboration. 
 First, Nietzsche writes that there is a “ranking” involved in the noble mode of evaluation. 
Often described as a pathos of distance, this ranking involves one group of people affirming 
themselves as “higher” than another. This means that one group sees itself as superior to the 
other in some important way. In the Genealogy, this pathos of distance is described as a 
“fundamental total feeling on the part of a higher ruling in retaliation to a lower order, to a 
‘below,’ – that is the origin of the antithesis of ‘good’ and ‘bad.’”27 It is clear how this selection 
from the First Essay illuminates the judgments of those on the “higher” end of this spectrum. 
Such people would be powerful and capable of acquiring the objects of their desires. On the 
other hand, those who happen to fall on the low end of the spectrum, upon having their desires 
thwarted by those who are more powerful, would certainly find themselves in an undesirable 
position. Indeed, they would have a great deal of incentive in re-working the existing evaluations 
that originated in the minds of those who are powerful. This leads us to the second important 
point regarding the pathos of distance: the normative consequence of the invention of Good and 
Evil.  
 The entire moral scheme of Good and Evil, as it was described in the discussion of the 
First Essay, was created in order to provide a means by which to undermine the evaluative mode 
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of the masters. In order to “get ahead” in any way, the slaves of the First Essay had to create 
some cunning way to invert the noble values, thereby stripping the nobles’ values of any 
perceived worth. This was achieved by praising those qualities which served the slaves best: for 
example, humility, being neighborly, graciousness, and meekness. But the masters would not 
simply abandon their sense of virtue; rather, this “inversion of the value-positing eye”28 would 
have to be achieved through cunning and clever means on the part of the slaves. A consequence 
of this would of course be that this change did not occur overnight. Instead, it was a very long 
nuanced process (indeed, this is a major point of the entire Genealogy). This inversion occurs as 
a consequence of the effects of blame. This factor is the key component of the slaves’ attempt to 
invert the values of the masters. This inversion allows for the slaves to have a means by which 
they can undermine the value judgments of the masters by imposing moral norms upon them. If 
the inversion of values is successful, then the masters will begin to abandon their value system to 
avoid reproach and condemnation. Indeed, once moral blame becomes an effective tool of 
morality, then bad conscience can be utilized to induce feelings of guilt within the minds of 
offenders. The remainder of the Genealogy is, in a sense, devoted to showing how these feelings 
of bad conscience and guilt are moralized in such a way that the ascetic ideal, a stark opposite to 
ideals of power and nobility, take hold.  
 Let’s consider what might be a silly example: there has been a decades-long debate in the 
world of soda. Coca-Cola and Pepsi Cola are two very popular brands which have been in 
competition with each other for years. There have even been famous “challenges” which are 
intended to display the superiority of one brand over the other. Let’s say that you are a Coke fan; 
this means that you consider Coke “good,” and Pepsi “bad.” This valuation is somewhat akin to 
the masters’ non-moral mode of evaluation. More importantly, there is no real sense in which 
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you can blame Pepsi for what you consider to be an inferior product. Rather, you simply look at 
Pepsi with a bit of disdain because it does not meet the standard of goodness you find in Coke. 
Nietzsche says that the noble mode “seeks its opposite only so as to affirm itself more gratefully 
and triumphantly – its negative concept ‘low,’ ‘common,’ ‘bad’ is only a subsequently-invented 
pale, contrasting image in relation to its positive basic concept.”29 In the example, then, the 
Coke-drinker does not consider Pepsi to be bad in any kind of moral sense; importantly, Pepsi is 
not blame-worthy for its product. Rather, Pepsi is simply a lesser drink in the eyes, or taste buds, 
rather, of the Coke-drinker. The slaves, however, lead to the growth of these notions of bad 
conscience and guilt as a result of their ressentiment-driven inversion of the nobles’ values.  
 In a way, we can think of the noble mode of evaluation as that which is self-affirming. 
On the other hand, “slave morality from the outset says No to what is ‘outside,’ what is 
‘different,’ what is ‘not itself’ . . . in order to exist, slave morality always needs a hostile external 
world; it needs, physiologically speaking, external stimuli in order to act at all – its action is 
fundamentally reaction.”30 What Nietzsche intends here is that in order for slave morality to 
work, it needs something to direct its ressentiment towards; there needs to be some external 
factor affecting one’s person in such a negative way that the stimulus could be condemned on 
moral grounds. In one rather scathing passage, Nietzsche writes that  
“[t]hey monopolize virtue, these weak, hopelessly sick people, there is no doubt 
of it: ‘we alone are the good and just,’ they say, ‘we alone are homines bonae 
voluntatis.’ They walk among us as embodied reproaches, as warnings to us – as 
if health, well-constitutedness, strength, pride, and the sense of power were in 
themselves necessarily vicious things for which one must pay some day, and pay 
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bitterly: how ready they themselves are at bottom to make one pay; how they 
crave to be hangmen.”31 
In this passage, we see how those who are weak and oppressed, or otherwise “sickly,” might 
look to those with power and health and, in order to redeem themselves, cast blame and 
condemnation on those with power. So, on this mode of moral evaluation, the slaves not only 
consider the actions of the powerful to be oppressive and detrimental to their own social 
standings, they go further by saying that the nobles are “vicious;” the slaves can feel a sense of 
righteous vengeance in thinking that their oppressors will one day get their just deserts for their 
actions and lifestyles.  
  What all of this demonstrates is that the content of what Nietzsche means by morality is a 
pretty far-reaching concept. Not only is it characterized by what is outlined by MPS, it also 
invloves those important notions of guilt and blame. Morality, for Nietzsche’s purposes, could 
then be summed up as any evaluative system which has a pro-attitude towards happiness, a con-
attitude towards suffering, and incorporates a notion of blame in order to devalue the lifestyles of 
those who do not conform to the moral scheme. For Nietzsche, such moralities are, as it has been 
presented, something worthy of a fuller, more in-depth critique. However, simply from what has 
been argued so far, perhaps there is not a compelling enough reason to seek out such a critique. 
Indeed, what if morality, even in this pejorative sense, could still be a good thing which serves to 
benefit humanity? Perhaps Nietzsche’s mission, instead of providing us with reasons to reject 
morality, has given us reason to believe that there are certain aspects of morality which we 
should keep intact rather than subject them to critique. To answer these issues, we must see what 
the truly questionable aspects of morality are and why Genealogy demonstrates the need for a 
fuller account of its detrimental effects.  
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3.2 Interpreting the Genealogy 
  With a general idea of what Nietzsche has in mind when he speaks of morality, one can 
better understand how the Genealogy works in his project of the critique of morality. It has been 
shown that the Genealogy is “primarily an explanatory account of the emergence of some 
distinctive set of beliefs, practices, and associated phenomena.”32 However, it has not yet been 
shown if there are any normative consequences that can be drawn from such an account. There 
has been a considerable amount of debate as to whether or not the Genealogy offers any sort of 
immanent critique of morality. Nietzsche does not appear to include any sort of revaluation of 
moral values within the context of the Genealogy; there are, however, various accounts of what 
role the Genealogy plays in the larger context of the critique of morality.  
 
3.2.1 Problems with Fallacious Reasoning 
One possible interpretation could suggest that the questionable origins of morality 
demonstrate that morality itself is a questionable set of values. At first glance, this might appear 
to be a sufficient explanation of how the Genealogy could work to unsettle one’s faith in 
morality. However, this position fails because it presents a genealogical fallacy. This fallacy is 
committed by claiming that the effects of a certain cause are condemnable solely on the basis 
that the cause is condemnable. To demonstrate the ineffectiveness of this explanation, consider 
the case of Henrietta Lacks: her case is quite controversial in modern bioethics because she is 
considered to have suffered breaches of medical autonomy. During her treatments for cervical 
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cancer, some of her cells were taken and used in research without her knowledge nor her 
consent. These cells, it was discovered, could be easily reproduced and used to perform various 
experiments. To this day, what are known as HeLa cells are still used in labs. In fact, these cells 
were instrumental in the creation of the polio vaccine. Unfortunately, Henrietta was unable to be 
saved, and her family never saw a dime of the vast amount of money that has been made from 
the reproduction and sale of her cells.
33
 Now, the way that these cells were acquired and used 
was certainly questionable by modern medical standards and deserves being subject to exposure; 
however, the life-saving polio vaccine has been a great discovery that has benefitted countless 
lives, and condemning this vaccine solely for its questionable origins just does not make logical 
sense. The genealogical fallacy can be summarized as the error in reason in which the origins of 
a belief or value shows that the belief itself is wrong.  
3.2.2 Kail’s Epistemological Destabilization Effect 
We have seen that Nietzsche, if he intends to use the Genealogy as a set-up for the 
critique of morality, cannot be committing the genealogical fallacy. So, what other account might 
be given for how the Genealogy should be interpreted? According to P.J.E. Kail, “Nietzsche’s 
genealogy has the consequence of destabilizing the moral beliefs it explains, namely by 
motivating the requirement to seek some further justification for those beliefs.”34 In order for this 
to work,  
“[the Genealogy] must dislodge the privileged status of these central normative 
beliefs . . . Nietzsche’s account of the emergence of the beliefs distinctive of MPS 
destabilizes the beliefs by uncovering the fact that the mechanisms productive of 
the beliefs are epistemically unreliable. Knowledge of this fact provides a reason 
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to treat such beliefs with suspicion unless and until some further justification for 
them is forthcoming.”35 
In other words, the Genealogy shows that there are naturalistic explanations for moral 
phenomena, and these naturalistic origins call into question the justifications typically given for 
moral values. If one takes values such as altruism, charity, selflessness, and pity as good and 
morally upright behavior, then he or she will have to go deeper than citing these values as simply 
being moral truths if the destabilization is effective. The Genealogy shows that such values 
actually are born out of feelings of ressentiment and guilt rather than out of “true” moral worth. 
Therefore, these beliefs “become not moral phenomena, but yet another interpretation of them. 
This leaves the questions of what justification and value they have wide open; as Nietzsche says, 
a ‘morality could even have grown out of an error, and the realization of this fact would not as 
much as touch the problem of its value.’”36 Given that morality can no longer be “taken for 
granted” as truths that simply are, we certainly have reason to question the need for morality. 
 Kail describes his account as an epistemological one. This means that he intends to show 
that the stories of the Genealogy destabilize morality as a firmly rooted set of beliefs. In the 
Genealogy, Nietzsche says that the supposed value of moral beliefs is taken “as given, as factual, 
as beyond all question; one has hitherto never doubted or hesitated in supposing ‘the good man’ 
to be of greater value than the ‘evil man,’ of greater value in the sense of furthering the 
advancement and prosperity of man in general.”37 What Kail is arguing is that the Genealogy 
demonstrates that such an assumption regarding moral values is epistemologically suspicious if 
Nietzsche’s version of their development is correct. This is a result of the destabilization effect 
mentioned above. Kail writes that “[a] destabilizing account involves an awareness of causes of 
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the belief that motivates a requirement to provide further justification for that belief.”38 
According to this interpretation, the Genealogy achieves this by showing that morality is borne 
not of actual content which supports moral claims, but by showing that moral claims are just 
interpretations of phenomena. Kail argues that “[k]nowing that beliefs have such sources 
destabilizes the beliefs . . . because they emerge regardless of any evidence in their favor, or 
indeed in the case of ressentiment’s operation in the slave revolt, despite the presence of what 
should be evidence to the contrary.”39 What Kail is getting at is that the origin of moral values 
such as selflessness, meekness, forgiveness, and the like are epistemically shaky because of a 
lack of evidence to actually support such values. They are especially suspect because they rise, 
not from any actual moral content, but from feelings of ressentiment which could be 
characterized as vengeful and hateful feelings. What is especially important to note here is that 
Kail’s account avoids the genealogical fallacy because it does not argue that moral values are in 
and of themselves bad values; the destabilization just requires that further justification be given 
to defend calling them good. However, I do not think that this account is complete according to 
what Nietzsche is attempting to achieve in the Genealogy.  
Perhaps, as Kail argues, the origins of morality are indeed epistemologically 
questionable. However, there seems to be some shortcomings with Kail’s account. First, it does 
not seem like Nietzsche would be satisfied with solely an epistemological account of the 
questionability of morality. The Genealogy does serve the purpose of unsettling our beliefs about 
morality, but it also seems to go deeper into the realm of the normative questionability of moral 
values. This leads to the second shortcoming of Kail’s account which concerns the way that one 
might react intellectually to his or her faith in morality being destabilized. 
                                               
38
 Kail, P. 228 
39
 Ibid, P. 229. 
Greene 25 
 
The destabilization effect demonstrates that our reasons to believe in morality are no 
longer justified; as a result, the value of these ideals is open to being questioned. Maybe they will 
turn out to be valuable after all, or maybe they will turn out to be detrimental in some way. Kail 
is successful in extrapolating this important part of the Genealogy. However, Nietzsche seems to 
want to provide us reasons for thinking that morality is sinister or detrimental in some way, and 
the destabilization effect, by itself, does not provide such reasons. If that is the case, then 
Nietzsche’s Genealogy could possibly miss its mark in its attempt to set up a full critique of 
moral values. Consider this example: for many years, you have been a devoted fan of the Star 
Wars franchise. You have acquired many different pieces of memorabilia, attended movie 
premiers, and even joined fan groups to show your love for the franchise. However, one day your 
psychoanalyst tells you that your fandom is a product of your hatred towards an old ex-girlfriend 
who was just as devoted to the Star Trek series. He says that your devotion to Star Wars is a 
psychological reaction to lash out at this person who broke your heart many years ago. Now, this 
calls into question whether Star Wars really means that much to you; still, though, the series has 
been able to help you get over the break-up and move on with your life. Indeed, if the truth is 
told, you really like the movies beyond this mere psychological reason, and you decide that Star 
Wars is something that you want to keep as a part of your life. This example is analogous to how 
one might evaluate morality post-destabilization. Even though one’s original justifications for 
believing morality is a valuable part of life have been removed by the Genealogy’s stories, one 
could still evaluate it as a positive component of his or her life because morality seems to serve 
his or her interests.
40
 Indeed, if it appears that moral values make your life go better, then, 
despite their questionable origins, it is conceivable that one would choose not to suspend his or 
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her acceptance of morality. In order to properly set up a critique, the Genealogy needs to give 
reasons for believing that morality is an unfavorable set of values.  
3.2.3 Historical and Critical Criteria 
In his essay, “The Relevance of History for Moral Philosophy: A Study of Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy,” Paul Katsafanas says that there are two important features of a proper interpretation 
of the Genealogy. The first criterion we will cover in our investigation is referred to as the 
“historical criterion.” This is important because the questionable aspects of morality cannot fully 
be appreciated without a proper understanding of the history of their origin and development. 
The second criterion is the “critical criterion.” This can be understood as the element of the 
Genealogy which provides us with a reason to question our accounts of morality. This criterion 
allows us to go beyond a destabilization effect and provides us a reason to purse such a critique. I 
will cover each of these in turn beginning with the historical component of Katsafanas’ 
interpretation of Nietzsche. 
From the discussions of the essays, it is clear that the Genealogy takes a historical form.  
This is no mistake as Nietzsche intends to show that cultural norms and values are not 
established overnight. Katsafanas writes that “Nietzsche frequently emphasizes that affects and 
drives cannot be altered by direct, immediate conscious decisions. Rather, transforming these 
psychic states takes time.”41 In the paper, Katsafanas utilizes examples to demonstrate how 
popular opinions change over time. One such example proceeds as follows:  
“Suppose an agent, under the pressure of a religious interpretation, regards 
manifestations of his sex drive as sinful. When he experiences or acts on sexual 
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urges, he feels guilt, shame, and so forth. However, later in his life this individual 
consciously rejects his religious upbringing: he becomes a committed atheist. 
Although the agent consciously pronounces his sex drive perfectly good, and 
rejects completely the concept of sinfulness, it is normal to assume that he will 
experience lingering traces of the old evaluation. We can imagine that, without 
being able to justify it, he still experiences residual shame and negative affects 
when sexual urges manifest themselves.”42 
What this example demonstrates is that one cannot consciously make such drastic changes in his 
or her affects and expect the new values to completely replace the old immediately. Indeed, we 
see this effect taking place in the earlier example regarding rock music. Although many people’s 
opinions have been changed, there are still disputes over its moral qualities. Since such affects 
might not fully be able to take hold within the context of one individual’s lifetime, it is easily 
conceivable how societal values take hold and change in a very slow and aggregative way. This 
also makes the issue with Kail’s account more apparent. Even though the person in the example 
above has rejected Christian values, he still experiences the guilt associated with Christian 
morality. How difficult might it be to imagine that under certain circumstances he might feel 
overwhelmed by these guilt feelings and return to his faith. This certainly would not satisfy 
Nietzsche as he wants to provide us with reasons to further question the value of morality. This 
example of the atheist specifically demonstrates the need for the Genealogy’s historical form. 
Without the historical components of the Genealogy, one would not have the proper historical 
distance to understand the way in which moral values originated, grew, and developed. This 
historical distance provides a means by which one can perceive how moral values are contingent 
upon numerous factors including social conditions and psychology.  
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 In cases such as this we see how Nietzsche’s views regarding psycho-social types play a 
large role in his explanations of the growth of moral values. In one instance, Nietzsche writes 
that “moralities are . . . merely a sign language of the affects.”43 In other words, whatever one 
considers to be a moral value can be signified by the feelings toward certain phenomena. Recall, 
however, that these feelings are simply a result of one’s culture and moral upbringing. They are 
able to change, though,  
“when new evaluations are coupled with habituation into new forms of life. This 
would include the acceptance of new interpretations of what one’s affects mean 
(e.g. interpreting the affect of bad conscience as guilt), new inducements to 
certain forms of activity (e.g. through religion and custom), and new conceptions 
of agency and responsibility (e.g. viewing the self as something distinct from the 
deed). These factors when coupled with the change in evaluative judgments, 
would gradually reconfigure our affects and desires.”44 
The historical criterion makes sense of these processes of change and the way they impact one’s 
moral beliefs and feelings. Further, this makes it clear that the issue for Nietzsche goes further 
than simply an epistemological problem. Indeed, Nietzsche not only intends to show that 
morality has questionable origins, but he is also concerned with the value of the growth and 
development of morality. For this aspect of our interpretation, we turn to Katsafanas’ critical 
criterion.  
 According to Katsafanas, the critical criterion “must explain why the Genealogy 
constitutes (or enables) a critique of modern morality.”45 In other words, this criterion provides 
the reasons why one should seek a fuller critique of moral values themselves, not just their 
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origins and growth. If successful, the critical criterion will demonstrate why the Genealogy does 
more than deliver a destabilizing account by providing reasons why morality could be a 
detrimental set of values. Rather than investigating the epistemological reasons for questioning 
morality, the critical criterion investigates what sorts of effects moral values might have and how 
they influence one’s ability to flourish. 
 
3.2.4 Nietzsche’s Higher Types and Flourishing 
 We have seen morality’s epistemically questionable origins and development in Kail’s 
account of destabilization; however, this position could fail to give us a proper reasons to 
consider why morality itself should be considered worthy of a full critique. However, what if it 
were the case that morality hindered one’s life in some significant way? Perhaps this possibility 
is not of concern to someone who feels like making personal sacrifices for the sake of morality is 
the right thing to do. Consider a contemporary case: in his famous essay, Famine, Affluence, and 
Morality, Peter Singer argues that one ought to give to charitable causes to the point of marginal 
utility. His principle states that we are required “to prevent bad things from happening unless in 
doing so we would be sacrificing something of comparable moral significance,” and this 
principle, he argues, “require[s] reducing ourselves to the point of marginal utility.”46 For Singer, 
marginal utility is the point at which by giving anymore you would place yourself in as bad, or 
worse, a situation as the people you intend to aid by doing so.
47
 Per this view, to be moral one 
must act in accordance with a very selfless set of values which would more than likely fall into 
those included under MPS. Further, this assertion would mean that those who do not abide by 
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such a principle could be blamed for failing to do the right thing. Indeed, if this principle was 
widely accepted, then it does not seem like much of a logical leap to assume that those who 
abstained from doing so would be seen as greedy, selfish, and indifferent towards the suffering 
of others. It seems like moral values could be problematic for those individuals who have self-
interested (not necessarily selfish) aspirations. Such a moral code could be especially detrimental 
to the flourishing of Nietzsche’s “higher types.” 
 Recall from our earlier discussion of MPS that Leiter claims the values of morality 
undermine the flourishing of higher types. A number of questions can now be raised regarding 
these people in relation to what aspects of morality are subject to large-scale scrutiny. Firstly, 
who are the “higher types?” And secondly, what features of morality could potentially 
undermine their ability to flourish? Let’s take each one of these questions in turn.  
 First, in order to understand how the values of morality could be detrimental to the higher 
types, we must first address who the higher types are. Leiter outlines five criteria which could be 
said to encapsulate Nietzsche’s meaning. These criteria are:  
(1) The higher type is solitary and deals with others only instrumentally . . .  
(2) The higher type seeks burdens and responsibilities, as he is driven towards the 
completion of a unifying project . . .  
(3) The higher type is healthy and resilient . . .  
(4) The higher type affirms life, meaning that he is prepared to will the eternal 
return of his life . . .  
(5) The higher [type] has a distinctive bearing toward others and especially 
toward himself: he has self-reverence.
48
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In the higher types, we see a psycho-social type characterized by feelings of self-worth, courage 
to seek out difficult tasks and take pride in their completion, ambitiousness, and strength. 
Examples of higher types, for Nietzsche would include people like Goethe, Beethoven, and 
(probably) Nietzsche himself.
49
 Higher types, for Nietzsche, exemplify what it means to be 
“great,” and he is worried that moral values might undermine such people from achieving their 
greatness as a result of their normative demands. This leads us to our second question: how 
might morality potentially undermine the flourishing of such higher types? 
 According to Katsafanas, an analysis of how morality could be detrimental would be to 
examine the concept of the will to power. This concept is central to Nietzsche’s philosophy, but 
for the purposes of this paper I will paint a simple picture of the will to power in order to 
demonstrate the importance of the critical criterion to a proper interpretation of the Genealogy. 
For Katsafanas, the will to power can be understood as “perpetually seeking and overcoming 
resistances to one’s ends. For example, an agent wills power in the pursuit of knowledge by 
striving to encounter and overcome intellectual problems in her pursuit of knowledge; or, an 
ascetic wills power by willing to encounter and overcome his body’s own resistances to self-
inflicted suffering.”50 Recall that one of the primary features of being a higher type is seeking out 
daunting tasks and overcoming them. The danger here is “the ways in which [morality] falsifies 
perceptions of power.”51 According to Kastafanas’ definition of the will to power, moral values 
could distort one’s perception of what it means to achieve power. For example, consider the 
moral value of humility. According to this value, one is properly exercising the will to power 
when one avoids being arrogant and achieves a lack of self-importance. However, it seems odd 
how values like this serve to increase one’s conception of his or her power. Morality distorts 
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these perceptions of power in three ways: 1) morality “promotes weakness and demonizes 
power;” 2) morality “associates negative emotions with manifestations of actual power and 
positive emotions with manifestations of actual weakness;” and 3) morality “employs a 
conception of agency that enables the weak to see their weakness as chosen, and hence as 
strength.”52 We see all three of these distortions at play in Nietzsche’s genealogical account of 
morality; consider the slaves again from the first essay: they invert the values of the powerful 
nobles, they deem the values of the nobles “evil,” and they consider themselves as being more 
worthy of moral praise for choosing their lives while blaming others for not choosing the same. 
However, for the higher types, one must constantly seek out and overcome new and more 
challenging obstacles to achieve the fullest expenditure of his or her will to power.  
 The danger that exists for higher types, then, is the possibility that such a person might 
fall victim to a moral system which distorts perceptions of power. Nietzsche considers this in the 
preface of the Genealogy when he asks: “What if a symptom of regression were inherent in the 
‘good,’ likewise a danger, a poison, a narcotic through which the present was possibly living at 
the expense of the future? . . . So that precisely morality would be to blame if the highest power 
and splendor actually possible to the type man was never in fact attained?”53 Here, I think, lies 
the crux of the issue for determining the critical criterion: if the ability of the higher types to 
flourish and drive humanity forward is hindered, then this would be an undesirable consequence 
of the growth of morality. Further, as we have learned, the values of MPS do not uphold those 
same values as a higher type would embrace. Consider the fact that in order to overcome certain 
obstacles, one must endure a certain amount of suffering. Nietzsche writes that “[w]hat does not 
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destroy me, makes me stronger.”54 Despite this quote being used by many pop figures such as 
Kelly Clarkson or Marvel’s Ultron in trivial ways, it still demonstrates an important aspect of the 
higher types’ mentality: that one must suffer to some extent to achieve his or her greatness. 
However, according to our account of morality, such an evaluation of suffering should be 
disvalued in favor of a more pro-happiness view. Indeed, the most basic components of a higher 
mode of evaluation, such as the pathos of distance, are staunchly opposed by the values of MPS 
in favor of values of equality and humility. In doing so, the proponents of morality claim to be 
serving the interest of mankind. This is a problem for Nietzsche as he thinks such an account 
could lead to a contemptible state of life: what he calls the “last man.”  
In Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Nietzsche describes his concept of the last man. 
The last man in this story represents what Nietzsche fears will become the norm for humanity if 
the higher types are unable to flourish. For these reasons, it serves as a good example for 
representing the dangers of what happens when one’s perceptions of perceived power are 
distorted by means of moral values. In Zarathustra’s speech, he says: 
“’We have invented happiness,’ say the last men, and they blink. They have left 
the regions where it was hard to live for one needs warmth. One still loves one’s 
neighbor, for one needs warmth. . . ‘Everybody wants the same, everybody is the 
same: whoever feels differently goes voluntarily into a madhouse’. . . ‘We have 
invented happiness,’ say the last men, and they blink.”55 
Here we see how the last men uphold values such as equality, neighbor-love, eradication of 
suffering, and happiness as ultimate goods. However, Nietzsche wants to say that these people 
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are contemptible because they are missing out on certain essential components of what it means 
to flourish. Certainly, we can see how a higher type would not be able to pursue his or her ends 
in the society of the last men. Due to this, we have found an effective means of fully 
destabilizing morality from its privileged status as well as a reason to pursue a full critique of 
moral values in order to determine how they systematically undermine the will to power. 
4. Conclusion 
 In the study of moral philosophy, investigations of all sorts take place. Nietzsche’s 
Genealogy is particularly interesting because it is not trying to find some justification in favor of 
moral values. For instance, Kant argues that morality is justified on the basis of human 
rationality. Mill argues that morality serves humanity by increasing the amount of happiness in 
the world. Even Aristotle argues that the moral life is the ultimate way to achieve flourishing in 
life. Nietzsche rejects all of these views by demonstrating how these values are 1) not grounded 
in any sense of “truth;” and 2) by demonstrating how moral values are questionable in terms of 
what makes one’s life go well. In other words, moral values have been taken as true by many 
philosophers before Nietzsche, and then they move on to persuade one to be moral beings. 
Nietzsche says that these values should not be adopted by everyone because doing so might 
result in a society which prevents the best and brightest from fulfilling their potential.  
 Nietzsche’s Genealogy serves Nietzsche’s goal of dislodging morality’s privileged status 
through various means. First, it displays anti-realism regarding moral truth. Nietzsche’s anti-
realist viewpoint argues that universal claims regarding morality are misguided. Attempts to 
institute “one universal morality for all” would necessarily hinder some peoples’ ability to 
flourish while serving the interests of others. Rather, than any sort of “real” and universal claims 
regarding morality fail to have substantive content on this view. Second, Nietzsche’s naturalism 
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shows how values are instilled as a result of one’s upbringing, psychology, and culture. These 
aspects of one’s life which constitute one’s psycho-social “type.” There are numerous factors at 
play in the construction of one’s type, and these factors are historical in nature. This is 
demonstrated by Foucault’s notions of descent and emergence. These two factors allow for the 
genealogist to track the origins of various values and sentiments, and they also establish what 
constituted their growth and development. These methods allow for us to gather certain 
normative consequences from Nietzsche’s genealogical project.  
We saw from Kail that the privileged status of morality’s origins is questionable due to 
the fact that evidence against the existence of morality are ignored. Kail argues that faith in 
morality is epistemically untenable because the typical justifications given for them are removed 
upon understanding their genealogical origins. However, Nietzsche seems to be doing more than 
trying to destabilize our faith in morality from an epistemological standpoint. For one, 
Nietzsche’s anti-realist viewpoint demonstrates that he is not solely concerned with moral 
“truths.” Second, the Genealogy is not solely concerned with the epistemically questionable 
origins of morality, but Nietzsche also is concerned with the possible detrimental effects that 
morality could possibly have. The combination of a historical criterion alongside a critical 
criterion demonstrates how the  
“acceptance of modern morality was causally responsible for producing a 
dramatic change in our affects, drives, and perceptions. This change caused us to 
perceive actual increases in power as reductions in power, and actual decreases in 
power as increases in power. Moreover, it led us to experience negative emotions 
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when engaging in activities that constitute greater manifestations of power, and 
positive emotions when engaging in activities that reduce power.”56 
Ultimately, Nietzsche fears that this systematic distortion in our perceptions of power could 
undermine the flourishing of the higher types. This effect can only be appreciated by assuming 
the proper historical distance from its causes. Here we see the importance of the Genealogy’s 
historical form. The discovery that morality could hinder the flourishing of these higher types 
constitutes the critical element of the Genealogy. The destabilization our faith in morality by 
investigating its historical origins combined with a critical criterion goes further than a solely 
epistemological account by showing how morality could actually have important normative 
consequences. The combination of these features allows for the Genealogy to achieve 
Nietzsche’s goal of providing a preparatory work which can serve as the basis for a full critique 
of moral values.  
  
 
  
                                               
56
 Katsafanas, P. 191. 
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